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Abstract
The objective of the study is to analyze the impact of the adoption of the Corporate
Governance Code over the dividend payout ratio in 111 companies listed on the Lima Stock
Exchange (LSE) from 2007 to 2015. The chosen methodology includes an unbalanced panel
data model with the dividend payout ratio as dependent variable and several independent
variables such as the adoption of a Corporate Governance Code and the Corporate Gover-
nance Quality. The results show that companies that have adopted a Corporate Governance
Code and especially those with a high quality in it pay more dividends despite the fact that
the dividend payout always presents a negative relation with the ownership concentration.
However, these are overall results and more studies need to be carried out at the industry
level to find out differences among them. This is the first study that establishes the
relationship between corporate governance and dividend payout in companies operating in
Peru. One important implication for institutional investors is that it is advisable to consider
the adoption and the quality of the code as stock selection criteria in order to obtain a higher
dividend payout from their investments.
JEL Classification: G32, G35.
Key Words: Corporate Governance, Dividend Policy.
Pol´ıtica de dividendos y buen gobierno corporativo en el Peru´:
¿Existe alguna relacio´n?
Resumen
El objetivo del estudio es analizar el impacto de la adopcio´n del Co´digo de Gobierno
Corporativo sobre el pago de dividendos en 111 compan˜´ıas listadas en la Bolsa de Valores de
Lima del 2007 al 2015. La metodolog´ıa escogida incluye un modelo de panel no balanceado,
con el ratio de pago de dividendos como variable dependiente y entre las variables
independientes la adopcio´n del Co´digo de Gobierno Corporativo y la Calidad del Gobierno
Corporativo. Los resultados muestran que las compan˜´ıas con un Co´digo de Gobierno
Corporativo y, especialmente, aquellas con una calidad superior del mismo, han pagado ma´s
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dividendos, ello a pesar de que el ratio de pago de dividendos siempre presenta una relacio´n
negativa con la concentracio´n de propiedad. Sin embargo estos son resultados generales
y ma´s estudios deben ser realizados a nivel de industrias para encontrar sus diferencias.
Este es el primer estudio que establece una relacio´n entre gobierno corporativo y pago de
dividendos en empresas que operan en el Peru´. Una implicancia importante para los inversores
institucionales es que es aconsejable considerar la adopcio´n y la calidad del Co´digo como un
criterio de seleccio´n de acciones con el fin de obtener un mayor pago de dividendos en sus
inversiones.
Clasificacio´n JEL: G32, G35.
Palabras clave: Gobierno Corporativo, Pol´ıtica de dividendos.
1. Introduccio´n
The dividend policy has been one of the most debated topic in the financial
literature. Although several researchers have developed theories and provided
us with empirical evidence, there is still lack of a general consensus. In 1976,
Fisher Black correctly predicted that the bigger the emphasis academics put
on the topic the bigger the debate will appear. Different explanations
to the problem have been proposed. According to Bhattacharya (1979) the
payment of dividends is the instrument used by the companies to give signals
of profitabilitys perspectives to the investors. In other words, if a company stops
paying dividends or reduces them, once a dividend policy has been declared,
it will experience a drop in its share price. Later, the company could also
experience higher costs in issuing new stocks.
The companies’ dividend policy is important for several reasons: first a
company uses the dividends to give signals about its stability and growth
opportunities to the investors; second dividend policy plays an important role
in the firms capital structure because the latter could be modified by the former
and finally dividends affect the companys stock price (Ghosh & Woolridge, 1988
and 1991).
On the other side, there are several theories that relate the dividends
payment to the agency costs (La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer and Vishny,
2000). The agency theory points out that the dividend payout could be
diminished because free cash flows might have been invested in non-profitable
projects by the firms management (Jensen, 1986). Hence, there is a link between
dividend distribution and the discretionary decision of what to do with available
free cash flows.
According to Gompers, Ishii and Metrick (2003) agency costs are linked to
the strength of shareholders rights, namely to the firms corporate governance.
Therefore, it is interesting to study whether the adoption of good corporate gov-
ernance practices is linked to the dividend distribution of companies. Good
Corporate Governance practices aim to attract capitals to guarantee
proper managerial practices and to protect investors rights with the objective
of promoting trust in the financial markets and competitiveness.
Managers operating in Peru are not unaware of the discussions about good
corporate governance practices. In fact, during the years, the local corporate
governance regulation has been adapting to these new trends, focusing the
efforts on the accomplishment of the international standards to protect minority
Revista Mexicana de Economı´a y Finanzas, Vol. 12, No. 2, (2017), pp. 103-116 105
investors given the high ownership concentration of the companies at the Lima
Stock Exchange (LSE).
In July 2008 the LSE launched the Good Corporate Governance Index
(GCGI) that is built upon a survey questionnaire on the 26 principles of good
corporate governance for Peruvian firms made by the Securities Exchange
Superintendence (SMV ), which is the national authority in charge
of supervising quoted companies. All companies listed at the LSE must fill
in the survey questionnaire with the support of auditors that must verify the
authenticity of the declaration. Finally the GCGI is build and disclosed after
some stocks additional requirements such as minimum liquidity.
Fuenzalida, Mongrut, Arteaga and Eurasquin (2013) find that
the announcement of the inclusion of a listed company in the GCGI yields a
positive abnormal return of about 1% on the day of the announcement. These
authors also find that investing in a portfolio of the best performers (democratic
portfolio) in the GCGI outperformed consistently in about 3% annually the
portfolio of investing in the worst performers (autocratic portfolio) in the GCGI
during the years 2004-2008.
Furthermore, Milton (2004) shows that the implementation of a Corporate
Governance Code leads to a higher dividend payout ratio in emerging countries.
Similarly, Kowalewski, Stetsyuk and Talavera (2008) demonstrate the existence
of a strong correlation between the quality of the corporate governance code
and the dividend payout ratio.
Given the above results, the main objective of this research is to analyze if
there is any link between the adoption of a corporate governance code and the
companys dividend payout ratio in Peru. The study goes further into examine
whether the quality of the adopted corporate governance code is linked to the
dividend payout ratio. The main contribution of this research is to establish
this link for companies operating in Peru.
The next section contains a short discussion of the relevant literature and
the development of the two main hypotheses. The third section one describes
the methodology applied and offers the main results and the last one examines
the implications of the study and concludes the study.
2. Literature Review
La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer and Vishny (2000) establish that managers
prefer to retain dividends or to reduce the risk of human capital loss, implying
that low dividend payout ratios are associated with low corporate governance
standards and with a poor protection of the stockholders rights. These authors
believe that those firms located in countries with high legal standards of
protection of the minority investors pay higher dividends compared to countries
where legal protection is weak. It is likely that the severity of the agency
cost would be inversely proportional to the strength of the shareholders rights
(Gompers, Ishii and Metrick, 2003). Companies that are exposed to the agency
problem tend to experiment higher gaps between property and control where
the rights of the minority shareholders are more repressed.
With respect to the dividend policy and its relationship with corporate
governance, Bebczuk (2005) states that the better the corporate governance
practices of the firm, the higher the dividend payment. This is consistent with
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the results of Kowalewski, Stetsyuk and Talavera (2008) that demonstrate that
the adoption of the Corporate Governance Code is an important determinant
in the dividend policy of Polish companies. To measure the quality of the
corporate governance they build a Transparency Disclosure Index (TDI) for
110 companies and find out that there is a strong positive correlation between
the index and the dividend payout ratio.
According to Burkart and Panunzi (2006) when minority stockholders
protection is weak, agency problems are very serious and they suggest the
separation between the control and the property of a company. The threat lies
in the fact that managers keep a strong preference for control and they do not
promote the payment of dividends. Jang-Chul and Young (2011) use the agency
theory to explore how the corporate governance quality affects the dividend
policy. Their results show a strong positive association between the corporate
governances quality and the dividend payment meaning that those companies
with a stronger corporate governance policy tend to pay higher dividends.
However, according to Sa´ez and Gutie´rrez (2014) dividend payout
ratios decrease when the structure of the ownership is highly concentrated,
evidence that might be explained by the absence of supervisions mechanisms
so controlling shareholders could take this advantage to expropriate minority
shareholders. It seems that this fact it is not always true because according
to Pindado, Requejo and de la Torre (2012) family-controlled firms distribute
more dividends in order to diminish the takeover apprehension of minority
shareholders.
Gonzales, Molina, Pablo and Rosso (2016), through a study that includes
six Latin-American countries, confirm that the higher the ownership
concentration, the fewer the dividends, although they also find out that if the
largest shareholder lives in a common-law country, the dividend is significantly
higher. They also suggest that a second large shareholder might acquire a
monitoring role and its presence would decrease even more the dividend payout
ratio. Koo, Ramalingegowda and Yu (2016) showed that also the quality of the
financial reporting might act as a corporate governance mechanism that leads
managers to distribute more dividends because it mitigates the free cash flow
problems.
Although it is possible to argue a double causality between corporate
governance and dividend policy it seems that the causality between both goes
from corporate governance to shareholder returns measures, among them the
dividend payout (Shabbir and Padgett, 2008). This remark leads us to establish
the following hypotheses:
H1: The dividend payout ratio increases as a consequence of the adoption
of the Corporate Governance Code.
By combining the model developed by La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer
and Vishny (2000) and the theories related to the free cash flows distribution
(Jensen, 1986), under the assumption that markets offer a weak protection
to shareholders, it is possible to establish two possible explanations for the
relationship between corporate governance and dividend policy (Easterbrook,
1984):
a) The “Substitute Model” hypothesis according to which the higher the
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shareholders’ rights the higher the dividend payout will be, meaning that there
is a positive relationship between corporate governance and dividend policy.
b) The “Opportunistic Management” hypothesis, which states that
managers tend to retain dividends with the aim of investing them in projects
that might benefit them but not the shareholders. Under this assumption,
one should expect an inverse relationship between corporate governance and
dividend payout.
Given the big disparity that one might encounter in emerging economies,
even among companies within the same country, concerning corporate
governance practices it is necessary to establish a second hypothesis in order
to favor one of the two previous explanations for the first hypothesis (Black,
2001). The second hypothesis must be related to the quality of the corporate
governance code:
H2: The higher the quality of the Corporate Governance Code the higher
the dividend payout of the company.
These two hypotheses will be tested in the next section
3. Methodology and Results
3.1 Data
For this study one used a sample of 111 non-financial firms from 2007 to 2015
listed on the Lima Stock Exchange (LSE). The choice of the time span lies on
the fact that in July 2008 Peru has launched the Good Corporate Governance
Index (GCGI), so it is important to explore the consequences of this change for
the shareholders.
Companies in the sample mostly belong to the manufacturing sector
(37.84%), others to the mining sector (15.32%) and other sectors (18.92%).
These three groups are followed by public companies (11.71%), agricultural
companies (10.81%), pension funds and insurance companies (5.40%). Their
financial statements, ownership composition and dividends declarations come
from Economatica and Bloomberg databases. The information related to the
adoption of a corporate governance code comes from the LSE while the one
concerning the quality of the code comes from the Securities Exchange
Superintendence (Superintendencia del Mercado de Valores - SMV) in Peru.
In order to obtain control groups that will make possible a robust
conclusion, the sample includes companies that pay and do not pay dividends
and with and without a Corporate Governance Code. Additionally, the sample
has been adjusted in order to withdraw observations with negative utility and
extreme positive dividends (outliers) to avoid biases.
From the total sample of 111 firms 63 companies (57%) do not have
a Corporate Governance Code, 41 companies (65%) paid dividends while 22
companies (35%) did not. The other portion corresponds to 48 companies (43%)
that adopted a Corporate Governance Code of which 36 companies (75%) paid
dividends and 12 companies (25%) did not.
Alternatively, one classified the companies that have paid dividends and
the ones that did not, and then split them into those that adopted a Corporate
Governance Code and those that did not. One obtains the following results: 34
companies (31%) did not pay dividends, of which 22 companies (65%) did not
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establish any Corporate Governance Code while 12 companies (35%) did. Of
the 77 companies that paid dividends (69%), 41 companies (53%) do not have
a Corporate Governance Code while 36 companies (47%) do.
This leads to the definition and the analysis of three different samples
and, therefore, three different models: a general model with 111 companies,
a model which includes the 63 companies without a Corporate Governance
Code and a model which includes the 77 companies that pay dividends.
The first subsample of 63 firms is examined in order to find out the
significance of ownership concentration as a proxy variable for not having a
Corporate Governance Code. The second subsample will help to understand
the interaction between the adoption of the code and its quality.
3.2 Variables
Table No 1 shows all the variables used in this study. The dependent variable is
the dividend payout ratio (Dpay). The literature offers several alternatives to
measure it such as dividends over cash flows, dividends over sales and dividends
over net profit. Authors such as La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer and Vishny
(2000) recommend using the ratio dividends over sales since it does not depend
on the accounting principles, which might vary among countries. However, this
study is not a cross-country one so differences in accounting principles wont play
a role. Hence, the chosen ratio is dividends over net profit, which measures how
the net profit is distributed and reinvested in the period.
Table 1. Description of the Variables
Source: Own elaboration.
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Due to the fact that our goal is to determine whether the adoption of a
Corporate Governance Code can influence the dividend payout ratio, one uses
a dichotomous variable (GOB) that assumes value one (1) starting from the
year in which the Code has been adopted and zero (0) before that year.
Another goal of this study is to check the impact of the quality of
the Corporate Governance Code (CGOB) into the dividend payout ratio, so
one uses the results of the survey questionnaire conducted by the SMV.
The questionnaire is based on 26 principles related to different topics such as
shareholders’ legal rights, communication and information transparency, Board
of Directors’ transparency, and so on. A score between zero (0) and four (4) is
given to each principle where zero represents no compliance and 4 means full
compliance to the principle. Based on this survey questionnaire, every firm in
the sample has a weighted average number for every year, not all principles have
the same weight, and this number is a proxy of the quality of the Corporate
Governance Code.
Several papers such as the one of Ahmed and Javid (2009) and Nuhu
(2014) have tried to explain the determinants of the dividend policy in emerging
economies and in particular they have used the dividend payout ratio. They
have encountered that the following variables usually pay a role in explaining
the dividend payout ratio of companies operating in emerging economies: the
firm size (SIZE), the degree of ownership concentration (CA), the companys
financial leverage (LEV) and the operating income (EBIT). Hence in this study
one must include them as control variables.
The size of the company, usually measured as the natural logarithm of sales,
has a positive effect on the dividend payout ratio since high sales’ volumes are
usually associated to larger companies and to larger dividend payments.
Ownership concentration is usually negatively related to the dividend
payout ratio this is because when ownership concentrations levels are high, the
risk of wealth expropriation against minority shareholders increases. In this
situation majority shareholders will rather keep free cash flows than distribute
them among minority shareholders.
Ownership concentration is usually measured through the Herfindahl
Index:
HN =
N∑
i=i
(
Si
TN
)2
(1)
Where
HN : Ownership concentration index,
N : Number of shareholders
Si: Number of shares owned by shareholder i,
TN :Total number of shares outstanding owned by N shareholders.
The main advantage of using this index is that it can be easily reproduced
(Cubbin and Leech, 1983). Let Pi represents the percentage of participation of
the shareholder i. Hence, equation (1) translates into equation (2) for the first
five shareholders:
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CA =
(
P1∑5
i=1
Pi
)2
+
(
P2∑5
i=1
Pi
)2
+
(
P3∑5
i=1
Pi
)2
+
(
P4∑
5
i=1
Pi
)2
+
(
P5∑
5
i=1
Pi
)2 (2)
It is reasonable to expect a negative relationship between the companys leverage
ratio and the dividend payout ratio. In other words, a high leverage ratio implies
a smaller payment of dividends, due to the fact that the free cash flow must be
used to repay the principal and the interests of debts.
The operating income reflects the availability of resources allocable to new
investments, which should increase the dividend payout ratio. Hence, an
increase in the company’s operating efficiency, measured through the EBIT,
represent an increase in available free cash flows and this could lead to a higher
dividend payout, so the expected relationship between both is a positive one.
Finally, it is important to control for the companies’ environment, in other
words for the macroeconomics effects. In particular, it is expected a positive
relationship between the growth of the Gross Domestic Product (GDP) and the
dividend payout, which means that as long as the economy grows, dividends
will grow as well.
3.3 Descriptive Statistics
Due to the fact that in 97% of our sample companies the ownership is
concentrated in the first five shareholders, one uses equations (1) and (2) to
calculate the Herfindahl Index. As reported by Fuenzalida, Mongrut, Nash
and Benavides (2008) companies in Latin America are characterized by
high concentration levels from the first to the fifth shareholder: 53% to the
first shareholder, 73% to the third and 79% to the fifth one. Our findings are
consistent to this pattern: 62% to the first shareholders, 80% to the third and
97% to the fifth one.
The Corporate Governance Quality is measured through a score that is
calculated only for the 48 companies that have implemented the Corporate
Governance Code since year 2007 and that have been evaluated by the SMV
through a survey questionnaire. These companies achieved an average grade of
3.57 on a scale that goes from 0 (no compliance to the principle) to 4 (complete
compliance to the principle), with 2.29 as the minimum grade and 4 as the
maximum grade. It has been encountered that companies that paid dividends
registered an average rating of 3.65 points against companies that did not pay
dividends with an average grade of 2.91 points.
Out of the 48 evaluated companies, 28 improved meaningfully their rating
between 2007 and 2015, 11 kept it more or less stable and the remaining ones
suffered a meaningful decrease. It is important to note that out of the 36 firms
that paid dividends 37% improved their ratings, while out of the 12 that did
not pay dividends, only a 17% improved their ratings.
Table No 2 offers the descriptive statistics of the above variables; it shows
the average dividend payout ratio for the 77 companies with a CGC that is
equal to 0.33 and it is in turn higher than the average dividend payout ratio
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of the 63 companies without a CGC that is equal to -0.34. A simple average
of the dividend payout ratio by economic sector reveals that the pension funds
register the higher dividend payout to their shareholders during the sample
period (77%), followed by public utilities (67%). Manufacturing companies,
mining companies, insurance companies, and agricultural companies follow have
averages of 42%, 22%, 13.5% and 0.95%, respectively.
Table 2. Descriptive Statistics.
The table reports descriptive statistics (average, coefficient of variation-CV,
maximum and minimum values) for four subsamples: the first subsample (A)
includes the total number of companies; the second subsample (B) corresponds
to all the companies without a Corporate Governance Code; the third subsample
(C) includes companies that have adopted the code, and the last subsample (D)
includes all the companies that have paid dividends at least once during the period.
Source: Own elaboration
From Table No 2, companies with a Corporate Governance Code have, on
average, a leverage of 60%, slightly less than those that did not have it (61.9%).
These results show that the relationship between leverage and the Corporate
Governance Code is not a clear-cut as stated by Benavides and Mongrut (2010)
for the case of Colombian companies. However, using the sample of companies
that pay and do not pay dividends there is a significant difference in the level
of leverage. Companies that pay dividends have an average leverage equal
to 58.8%, while companies that do not pay dividends have an average level
of leverage equal to 65.3%. This can be explained because highly leveraged
companies prefer to pay lower dividends in order to avoid insolvency risk.
Concerning companys size, one finds out those companies that paid
dividends are bigger than those that did not. In particular, the former group
is 241% bigger than the latter. Moreover, those that established a Corporate
Governance Code are 202% bigger than those that did not.
With respect to the EBIT, companies with a Corporate Governance Code
have a better operating performance than the others. In fact, they have, on
average, an EBIT of 107.46 MM Soles as compared to companies without a
code with an average EBIT of 47.99 MM Soles.
3.4 Results
One has decided to use an unbalanced Panel Data Model to test for the first
hypothesis (H1) because in this way one can take full advantage of the sample.
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Hence, one performed the Breusch and Pagan test to model the error, whose
null hypothesis is that the variance of the error, which does not vary through
time but only through companies, is equal to zero. The null hypothesis was
rejected, so one must model the non-observable heterogeneity.
Therefore, one used the Hausman test in order to choose between
fixed-effect or random-effect model for heterogeneity, whose null hypothesis is
that the non-observable effects are not correlated with the explanatory
variables. The null hypothesis was rejected, which means that was better to
use the fixed-effect model. Then, it was important to test for the presence of
heteroskedasticity in the residuals, so one used the modified Wald test
for fixed-effect Models, whose null hypothesis is that the volatility is equal for
all the individuals and whose main advantage is that it works properly for
unbalanced panel data. The null hypothesis was strictly rejected.
One also tried to account for time effects using dummy variables for the
year of adoption of the code in order to model unobservable characteristics that
do not change between companies but over time. The test of jointly significance
of these variables was rejected, meaning it was not necessary to include time
variables in the model.
Finally, one verified the presence of contemporary and serial correlation;
the null hypothesis was rejected, so the model should be corrected for the
heteroskedasticity and contemporary correlation. There are two methodologies
to correct for this kind of problem in panel data. The first one is to include a
dichotomous variable for each cross-sectional observation that is present in the
sample. However, following DeAngelo and DeAngelo (1990), Fama and French
(2001), Bebczuck (2005) and taking into account the possibility of an “incidental
parameters” problem, stated by Neyman and Scott (1948) it is better to model
without controlling for each company’s fixed-effect.
The second one is the generalized least square (GLS) regression with panel
corrected standard errors. Beck and Katz (1995) demonstrated that the GLS
estimators are corrected only for samples with a great amount of time units
(years in this case) and few cross observations (number of firms). Although
there is not an appropriate minimum time span that every cross section must
have, Beck (2001) argues that a good number would be 10. Concerning the
number of cross section units, there is not a minimum amount required,
meaning that there is no need for them to be a large quantity. Because of these
considerations, one used the GLS regression with standard errors corrected for
the panel in order to correct for serial correlation and heteroskedasticity.
Equation (3) shows the first model (all variables previously defined):
Dpayit = α0+β1GDPit+β2EBITit+β3SIZEit+β4LEVit+β5GOBit+εit (3)
where:i = 1 · · ·N y t = 1 · · ·T
First panel (Model 1) of Table No 3 shows positive relationship between
the adoption of the corporate governance code (GOB) and the dividend
payout ratio (DPay). Moreover, results show a positive relationship between
the leverage level (LEV ) and the dividend payout (DPay), while the EBIT
shows a negative relationship with the dividend payout (DPay). Although
this may not seem consistent with the expected sign, this could signal
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that companies, on average, have very good investment opportunities and they
are getting more debt in order to afford them. Hence, companies with good
investment opportunities tend to distribute lower dividends.
As expected, the company’s size (Size) has a positive effect over the
dividend payout ratio (DPay). In other words, larger companies tend to pay
higher dividends than smaller firms. Finally, the annual growth of the GDP is
positively related to the dividend payout ratio (DPay). This suggests that, as
the Peruvian economy grows more, companies distribute more dividends.
In order to test for the second hypothesis, the variable adoption of the
code (GOB) is substituted with the one that measures the quality of the code
(CGOB), as follows:
Dpayit = α0+β1GDPit+β2EBITit+β3SIZEit+β4LEVit++β5CGOBit+εit
(4)
where:i = 1 · · ·N y t = 1 · · ·T
The second panel of Table No 3 (Model 2) shows results that support the
second hypothesis. Hence, the higher the quality of the corporate governance
code (CGOB) the higher will be the dividend payout ratio (DPay). The signs
and significance, with the exception of the growth rate of the GDP , are equal
to the previous model.
The third panel of Table No 3 (Model 3) shows the results for the subsample
of companies (63) that didnt adopt a corporate governance code, regardless if
they pay dividends or not. Given the fact that these companies didnt adopt a
CGC it is very important to include the variable ownership concentration (CA)
into the analysis.
This variable could be thought as a substitute for the corporate governance
of the company. The variable ownership concentration (CA) is highly significant
and negatively related to the dividend payout, so the more concentrated is the
ownership of the company, the lower will be the dividend payout ratio.
Finally, the fourth panel in Table No 3 shows the results for the
sample of companies (77) that pay dividends, regardless if they have
corporate governance code or not. It is interesting to note that for
this subsample the statistical significance and sign of the variables remain the
same with the exception of the annual growth rate of the GDP , which now
has a negative coefficient but it is not significant. It is possible that for this
subsample the vast majority of companies has a well-established dividend policy,
so neither the ownership concentration nor the country GDP growth will affect
this decision.
114 Nueva E´poca REMEF (The Mexican Journal of Economics and Finance)
Table 3. Estimation of the Models.
The dependent variable is the dividend payout ratio (Dpay). The table
shows the results of the panel data model with standard errors corrected
for heteroskedasticity and contemporary correlation. The sample of
Model 1 and 2 is composed by 111 non-financial companies. Model 1
measures the impact of the adoption of the Corporate Governance Code
(GOB). Model 2 measures the impact of the quality of the Corporate
Governance code (CGOB). Model 3 only includes companies that
did not adopt a CGC regardless if they pay dividends or not. Model
4: only includes companies that pay dividends regardless if they have
adopted a CGC. The definition of the control variables are the ones
reported in Table 1.
Source: Own elaboration
4. Conclusion
This research aims to identify whether there is a link between the adoption
and the quality of the Corporate Governance Code and the dividend payout
for Peruvian firms, a relationship that has not been explored before. Through
an unbalanced panel data model and the use of control groups, it has been
possible to address the initial question, concluding that both factors have a
Revista Mexicana de Economı´a y Finanzas, Vol. 12, No. 2, (2017), pp. 103-116 115
significant impact on the dividend payout of the companies quoted of the Lima
Stock Exchange (LSE).
This study also highlights the fact that ownership concentration could be
a good proxy for corporate governance in companies that didnt adopt any
corporate governance code because the more concentrated is their ownership
is, the lower the dividends they are going to pay. Furthermore, there seems to
be a well-established group of companies with a declared dividend policy that
they have to honor regardless if they have or not a corporate governance code.
During the years of the study (2007-2015), the Peruvian economy has grown
6% annually well above the average of Latin American countries. Hence, good
investments opportunities came along and companies became more indebted
and invested more in new projects instead of distributing more dividends
unless they had a declared dividend policy. Larger firms distributed more
dividends than smaller ones, most of them because they have adopted a
corporate governance code due to the higher awareness of the average Peruvian
investor with respect to corporate governance practices since the launch of the
Good Corporate Governance Index in 2008.
It is interesting to note that the economic sector where the vast minority
of investors is investing now (i.e. pension funds) is precisely the one that pays
higher dividends. In other words institutional investors, when considering where
to invest their fund, are perhaps already taking into account the corporate
governance of the company. In particular, this study implies that they do not
have to pay attention only to the adoption of a code but also to its quality
especially in the case of companies with a non-declared dividend policy. Future
line of research might concentrate efforts at the industry level in order to find
out what explains differences in dividend payout. In addition, it might focus in
explaining the relationship between a declared dividend policy and corporate
governance.
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